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                     Appellant Cross-Appellee 
 
v. 
 
WALTER O'CHESKEY,  Trustee 
 
                     Appellee Cross-Appellant 
 
 
 
 
Appeals from the United States District Court 
for the Northern District of Texas 
 
 
Before KING, DAVIS, and OWEN, Circuit Judges. 
KING, Circuit Judge: 
Appellant Robert Templeton invested in certain limited partnerships 
formed under the auspices of American Housing Foundation, the debtor, which 
was in the business of developing low-income housing projects.  American 
Housing Foundation, which issued guaranties of Templeton’s investments, 
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ultimately filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy.  Templeton asserted claims against 
American Housing Foundation in bankruptcy based on the guaranties and 
based on various state law causes of action related to his investments.  The 
bankruptcy court issued a judgment subordinating those claims “pursuant to 
the provisions of 11 U.S.C. § 510(b).”  The court also voided, as preferential, 
transfers made to Templeton within 90 days of the bankruptcy filing.  
However, the bankruptcy court refused to void allegedly fraudulent transfers. 
The parties cross-appealed to the district court, which affirmed the 
bankruptcy court’s judgment in its entirety.  The parties now cross-appeal to 
this court.  For the following reasons, we AFFIRM in part and REVERSE in 
part the judgment below. 
I. Factual and Procedural Background 
A. Factual Background 
Steve W. Sterquell, a certified public accountant, was the president and 
executive director of debtor American Housing Foundation (“AHF”).  Founded 
by Sterquell in 1989, AHF is a 501(c)(3) non-profit, tax-exempt entity which 
develops low-income housing projects.  By 2009, AHF owned or managed 
approximately 14,000 housing units across nine states.  Many of these 
properties were eligible for Low Income Housing Tax Credits (LIHTC) and 
other tax exemptions and financial aid. 
AHF used these tax advantages in the financing of its developments.  
Among other arrangements, AHF created various single-purpose limited 
partnerships (“LPs”) to fund these projects.1  Either AHF or one of its wholly-
owned subsidiaries served as the general partner for these LPs.  Private 
investors would buy into the LPs and serve as limited partners; AHF 
                                         
1 AHF also used, for example, tax-exempt bonds to finance acquisitions. 
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guaranteed repayment of those investments, often unconditionally, and 
sometimes with interest.  AHF purportedly sought investments in these LPs 
to cover certain “soft” costs for its projects—e.g., attorney’s fees, architect’s 
fees, surveying fees, paint, as well as expenses related to the LIHTC 
application process.2  AHF represented that through the LIHTC program, 
investors could “make an equity contribution to the development of rental units 
for low-income households” and receive “a dollar-for-dollar reduction of their 
tax liability.”3  This general arrangement is not an uncommon method of 
funding low-income housing developments.  See Eric Mittereder, Pushing the 
Limits: Nonprofit Guarantees in LIHTC Joint Ventures, 22 J. Affordable Hous. 
& Cmty. Dev. L. 79, 82–84 (2013); Roberta L. Rubin & Jonathan Klein, 
Nonprofit Guaranties in Tax Credit Transactions: A New Era?, 15 J. Affordable 
Hous. & Cmty. Dev. L. 314, 315–16 (2006); Jonathan Klein & Roberta Rubin, 
Nonprofit Guaranties in Tax Credit Transactions, 9 J. Affordable Hous. & 
Cmty. Dev. L. 302, 308–09 (2000) (“During the predevelopment stage of an 
affordable housing development, a stage that may take one year, two years, or 
even longer, seed money financing is essential.  Virtually no predevelopment 
lender will provide unsecured funding to a single-purpose limited partnership 
for a project that does not have permits, approvals, complete financing, and 
sometimes even real estate without an unlimited guaranty of repayment.”).4 
Appellant Robert Templeton is a trial attorney who has practiced law in 
Texas for over fifty years.  Templeton became acquainted with Sterquell in the 
                                         
2 These costs typically could not be financed through banks. 
3 LPs are pass-through entities for tax purposes.  See 26 U.S.C. § 701. 
4 The IRS has issued guidance for limiting guaranties in LIHTC partnerships “to 
ensure that the nonprofit’s obligations to its for-profit partner do not violate its charitable 
purpose.”  Mittereder, supra, at 84–85. 
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1980s.  Starting in the late 1990s, Templeton and his wife began investing in 
AHF and AHF-related entities through Sterquell—ultimately investing over 
$5 million.  Most relevant here, from 2006 to 2008, Templeton invested in 
various LPs in the manner described above—i.e., either AHF or a wholly-
owned AHF subsidiary served as the general partner (taking a 1% or less 
equity interest in the LP), while Templeton served as a limited partner (taking, 
along with other limited partners, most of the equity in the LP).  Templeton’s 
investments in five of these LPs—GOZ No. 1, Ltd. (“GOZ”); LIHTC-M2M No. 
2, LP (“M2M-2”); LIHTC-M2M No. 3, LP (“M2M-3”); LIHTC Walden II 
Development, Ltd. (“Walden II”); and AHF Gray Ranch, Ltd. (“Gray Ranch”)—
are at issue in the present appeal.5   
These LPs, in which Templeton invested over $2 million,6 were formed 
for the purposes of developing various residential properties.  Because these 
investments do not appear to have been well-documented, the details 
surrounding the investments are less than clear.  For instance, according to 
Templeton, some of his later investments consisted of the “rolled over” value of 
his earlier investments.  In any event, concurrent with each investment, AHF 
purported to guaranty repayment of the investment—sometimes with interest.  
The guaranty documents, however, are in key respects flawed.  For example, 
some of the documents state that AHF “agree[d] to pay, when due or declared 
due as provided in the Loan Documents, the Guaranteed Investment to 
[Templeton]”—even though there do not appear to be any associated “Loan 
Documents.”  With respect to another LP, AHF guaranteed the return of 
                                         
5 During this time period, Templeton also invested in WI-HURIKE, Ltd. (“Hurike”).  
However, Templeton, dropped his claims based on his Hurike investment after the 
bankruptcy court disallowed the Hurike-based claim of another creditor.  As such, those 
claims are not at issue in this appeal. 
6 In 2007, Templeton earned over $8 million through the sale of certain oil and gas 
interests. 
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Templeton’s “Initial Capital Contribution”—defined as the amount of cash 
Templeton invested “prior to the Effective Date”—even though Templeton 
made all of his investments after that Effective Date.7 
Templeton testified that he invested in the LPs to make money, not to 
gain tax benefits: “The reason I got into [these investments] is this simple.  
This was the safest kind of investment that I had seen with those guarantees, 
with the financial condition of this company and the history that I had, and 
the return.”  However, the record is clear that Templeton sought significant 
tax benefits as a result of most of his investments.  In addition, Templeton 
received quarterly interest payments in relation to his investments in Walden 
II. 
It is undisputed that many of the funds Templeton and others invested 
in the LPs were not put to their intended purposes.  Rather, Sterquell used his 
LIHTC investment arrangements to obtain funds and fraudulently divert them 
from the LPs, using the funds to benefit himself, AHF, and other associated 
entities for purposes other than the purported aims of the LPs.  In particular, 
the bankruptcy court found that AHF and Sterquell used AHF Development, 
Ltd. (“AHFD”)—an LP for which AHF served as general partner—as a conduit 
bank account for these activities.  The Trustee’s First Amended Disclosure 
Statement (“Disclosure Statement”) describes the events leading to AHF’s 
bankruptcy: 
Prior to the [bankruptcy], [AHF] pursued an aggressive strategy of 
heavily leveraged acquisitions of properties across the nation.  As 
many as 200 satellite entities were created to facilitate multiple 
investments in low-income housing tax-credit properties.  During 
this time, [AHF] was focused almost exclusively on deals.  There 
was no focus on managing the properties acquired.  Over the 
                                         
7 However, for the reasons discussed below, we need not decide the validity of these 
guaranties. 
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course of time, because of tightening financial markets and the 
inability to obtain tax credit allocations, it became more and more 
difficult for [AHF] to obtain sufficient cash from lenders or 
investors to fund all of the various obligations of [AHF].  As a 
result, [AHF] took cash from properties and used that cash to pay 
obligations of [AHF] and its related entities.  This cash drain from 
the properties resulted in a deterioration in the condition of the 
properties because no funds were then available for basic upkeep. 
Sterquell committed suicide on April 1, 2009, prompting investigation into his 
activities and, ultimately, AHF’s bankruptcy.  Initially, Templeton led a group 
of creditors and investors that attempted to obtain information regarding the 
activities of Sterquell and AHF prior to his death.  According to the Disclosure 
Statement, the creditors and investors concluded that “Sterquell had worked 
with a complex web of interrelated entities that apparently received funds from 
[AHF] and investors” and “funds invested were not always put in the accounts 
of the entities in which the funds were invested.”  The group also discovered 
that just prior to his death, Sterquell had transferred approximately $24 
million in life insurance funds from AHF to trusts controlled by or for the 
benefit of the Sterquell family.8 
B. Procedural Background 
On April 21, 2009, creditors of AHF filed an involuntary petition against 
it pursuant to Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code.  On June 11, 2009, AHF 
filed a voluntary petition pursuant to Chapter 11.  The bankruptcy court 
consolidated the two cases and appointed Walter O’Cheskey as the Chapter 11 
Trustee.  On December 7, 2010, the bankruptcy court approved the Second 
Amended Joint Chapter 11 Plan Filed by the Chapter 11 Trustee and the 
Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors (the “Plan”). 
                                         
8 Ultimately, Templeton, as the initial Chairman of the Creditors Committee in the 
AHF Bankruptcy, brought an adversary action and successfully litigated for the return of 
those life insurance proceeds to the bankruptcy estate.  
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1. The Plan and Disclosure Statement 
The Plan elucidates the scope of this bankruptcy—involving claims 
totaling more than $100 million.  Under the Plan, creditors’ claims are 
prioritized into 19 classes.  Most relevant here are the last three classes—Class 
17, Class 18, and Class 19.  Class 17 applies to “Allowed General Unsecured 
Claims.”  Under the Plan, claims in that class (estimated at between $70.6 and 
$87.2 million) are entitled to receive a pro rata share of distributions from the 
trust assets after liquidation and after payment in full of claims in Classes 1 
through 14.  The Plan further estimates the recovery for claims in this class at 
between 20% and 40%.  Templeton contends that his claims should fall within 
this class. 
The Trustee contends, however, that to the extent Templeton’s claims 
are valid, those claims should fall within Class 18—“Allowed Subordinated 
Claims.”  The Plan estimates that approximately $8 million in claims fall 
within this class—for which the estimated recovery is 0%.9  The Disclosure 
Statement sheds light on the Trustee’s original reason for seeking 
subordination of certain claims (such as Templeton’s) into Class 18: 
The Chapter 11 Trustee believes that, while AHF and its 
tax-credit limited partners were engaged in the legitimate 
affordable housing business, Sterquell and some, but not all, “soft-
money” investors were involved in the illegitimate activity of 
manufacturing illegitimate tax basis and therefore taking 
illegitimate tax deductions in return for what were in actuality 
loans. 
. . . 
The soft-money structure was sometimes designed by 
Sterquell and participated in by certain “soft-money” investors, 
who knew or should have known that the investment was purely 
                                         
9 According to the Plan, claims in Class 18 will not be paid out until payment in full 
of the claims in Classes 1 through 17. 
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for illegitimate and improper tax purposes.  The Chapter 11 
Trustee believes that the real purpose was to disguise true loans 
as equity investments to take tax deductions through falsely 
manufactured tax basis in amounts several times the actual 
investment.  These soft-money claims relate to money invested in 
Affiliates listed on Exhibit F attached hereto.  The Chapter 11 
Trustee intends to object to and request subordination of soft-
money-investor claims arising from or related [to] an abusive tax 
shelter.   
To be clear, some soft-money-investor claims may not arise 
from or relate to an abusive tax shelter and may be legitimate, 
allowable claims.  But some, not all, soft-money-investor claims 
appear to arise from or relate to an abusive tax shelter and may, 
therefore, be objected to and/or subject to a request to subordinate 
such claims to other unsecured claims. 
The final class, Class 19, applies to “Allowed Interests in the Debtor.”  
The Plan states that because AHF is a tax-exempt 501(c)(3) entity, “there are 
no Allowed Interests in [AHF].”  Alternatively, the Plan states that “if such 
Interests exist, holders of such Interests shall receive no Distributions or retain 
any property under this Plan on account of such Interests.” 
2. Templeton’s Claim and the Trustee’s Complaint 
On October 5, 2009, Templeton filed in the bankruptcy proceeding a 
Proof of Claim, which he most recently amended on October 7, 2011 (the 
“Claim”).  In his Claim, Templeton asserted a “Liquidated Unsecured Claim,” 
in which he sought reimbursement and attorney’s fees relating to his 
investments in GOZ, M2M-2, M2M-3, Walden II, and Gray Ranch.  Templeton 
also brought an “Unliquidated Unsecured Claim,” asserting fraud, breach of 
fiduciary duties, and money-had-and-received claims in relation to those 
investments.  Finally, Templeton asserted “a claim of constructive trust and 
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equitable lien on all funds and assets of [AHF] that are traceable from 
Templeton’s funds and respective Partnership funds received by [AHF].”10 
On August 31, 2010, the Trustee commenced the present adversary 
proceeding by filing a complaint objecting to Templeton’s Claim on various 
grounds.  The Trustee filed an amended complaint on April 4, 2011, contending 
that the guarantees are not valid contractual obligations and, alternatively, 
that the entirety of Templeton’s Claim should be subordinated to the claims of 
all general unsecured creditors.  The Trustee also alleges causes of action for 
the avoidance and recovery of various allegedly fraudulent and preferential 
transfers. 
3. Bankruptcy Court Decision 
Over the course of 11 months, the bankruptcy court held a 25-day trial 
in this matter, issuing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on March 30, 
2013.  In its conclusions of law, the bankruptcy court began by noting that 
“[t]he Templeton Deals frustrate legal analysis.”  The court summarized the 
deals as follows: 
In each deal, Templeton was a major investor.  For the same 
investment dollars, Templeton received a guaranty from AHF, 
which, according to Templeton, was a guaranty of repayment of 
the amount of the investment.  Templeton contends that the 
guaranties are, in effect, unconditional promises to repay by AHF 
the amount of the investments.  But a guaranty is part of a three-
party transaction and is a promise to answer for the repayment of 
a debt.  How does a guaranty bootstrap the Templeton investments 
into something more?  Templeton’s construction makes the 
guaranties promissory notes.  By the very structure of each of the 
Templeton Deals, AHF received nothing in return for its guaranty.  
In each instance, AHF is, per the deal, nothing more than a 
fractional interest holder in the limited partnership into which 
                                         
10 Templeton also brought various “Alternative Derivative Claims” on behalf of the 
LPs in which he invested.  These claims are not at issue in this appeal. 
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Templeton’s investment dollars were to flow.  The structure defies 
an interpretation that AHF received any consideration for its 
absolute, unconditional promise to repay Templeton’s investment. 
The court also determined that the guaranties “do not actually provide that 
AHF guaranteed the amount of Templeton’s investments.”  Moreover, the court 
determined that there was no evidence that the interests Templeton had 
purportedly “rolled over” as part of his investment in Walden II had any real 
value. 
The bankruptcy court next determined that, in order to address 
Templeton’s Claim and the Trustee’s causes of action, it needed to characterize 
Templeton’s deals.  The court “look[ed] behind the form of the Templeton Deals 
and construe[d] each deal as an integrated whole.”  The court deemed the deals 
“wildly beneficial to Templeton” and “too good to be true,” and determined that 
“[t]he ‘product’ Templeton acquired as a result of his investment was not based 
on economic reality.”  The court further found that Templeton was “at 
best, . . . willfully blind to the risks” of his investments and “was clearly 
complicit with Sterquell at the threshold of each of these deals.”  Noting that 
the bankruptcy courts have the power to recharacterize debt as equity, the 
court looked to Texas law to “determine whether the Templeton Deals are 
investments that create . . . an equity claim or debt subject to treatment as an 
unsecured claim.”  Applying various factors drawn from the caselaw, the court 
concluded “that Templeton’s ‘investments’ were indeed equity investments and 
must be treated as such.” 
The court then proceeded to address mandatory subordination under 
Section 510(b).  Noting that the term “security” is defined broadly under the 
Bankruptcy Code, the court determined that Templeton’s investments—which 
the court had already deemed equity investments—constitute “securities” 
under the Code.  Therefore, the court concluded that Templeton’s unliquidated 
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claims (based on fraud and related theories) fell within the requirements of 
Section 510(b).  The court rejected Templeton’s argument that he did not own 
any interest in AHF (only in the LPs), noting that Section 510(b) also applies 
to affiliates of the debtor.  The court determined that the various LPs constitute 
affiliates of AHF, given that AHF fully controlled even the LPs for which it did 
not serve as a general partner. 
The court next denied the Trustee’s fraudulent transfer claim, 
concluding that Templeton “gave value and did so in good faith for his 
investments.”  The court rejected the argument that Templeton’s participation 
in an illegitimate tax scheme defeated an assertion of good faith, given that 
“any complicity by Templeton with Sterquell concerning illegitimate tax deals 
did not defraud other creditors of AHF.”  The court did, however, void various 
preferential transfers made to Templeton within 90 days of AHF’s filing of 
bankruptcy, reasoning that the funds came from an account of AHFD which 
was “wholly controlled by AHF and, therefore, constitute[d] payments from 
AHF.”11 
In its judgment, the bankruptcy court ordered that: 
• “Templeton’s Claim is subordinated to all allowed general 
unsecured claims pursuant to the provisions of 11 U.S.C. § 510(b);” 
• “The Trustee’s cause of action for the equitable subordination of 
Templeton’s Claim pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 510(c) is denied;” 
• “The Trustee’s cause of action for the avoidance and recovery of 
fraudulent transfers to Templeton under 11 U.S.C. § 548 is 
denied;” and 
                                         
11 In its findings of fact, the court found that AHFD was “an entity controlled by AHF 
and Sterquell and used by AHF and Sterquell as a conduit bank account.” 
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• “The Trustee’s cause of action for the avoidance and recovery of 
preferential transfers in the amount of $157,500 to Templeton is 
granted under 11 U.S.C. § 547(b).” 
4. District Court Decision 
On appeal, the district court affirmed the bankruptcy court’s judgment 
in full.  The court first adopted the bankruptcy court’s findings of fact, 
concluding that the findings were supported by evidence and not clearly 
erroneous.  The district court also determined that the bankruptcy court did 
not err in recharacterizing and subordinating Templeton’s claims, given that 
(1) the LPs were affiliates of AHF; and (2) the bankruptcy court “properly relied 
upon the evidence and substance of the transactions in finding that the claims 
arose from the purchase of equity.”  With respect to the affiliate issue, the 
district court noted that “Templeton did not object to or appeal the order 
confirming the plan, which incorporated as affiliates all the [LPs] at issue.”  
The court further held that the bankruptcy court did not err in granting the 
Trustee’s claim for preferential transfers, as it found no error in the 
bankruptcy court’s findings that AHFD “was nothing more than a pass-
through conduit bank account.”  The district court also rejected the argument 
that the payments from AHFD to Templeton were made in the ordinary course 
of business, as the payments were made in furtherance of fraud.  With respect 
to the purportedly fraudulent transfers, the district court affirmed the 
bankruptcy court’s finding of good faith, as the evidence supported the 
bankruptcy court’s findings that (1) Templeton gave value to AHF, and (2) 
Templeton gave such value in good faith. 
II. Standard of Review 
This court reviews the bankruptcy court’s findings of fact for clear error 
and its conclusions of law de novo.  Morton v. Yonkers (In re Vallecito Gas, 
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L.L.C.), 771 F.3d 929, 932 (5th Cir. 2014).  “Under a clear error standard, this 
court will reverse only if, on the entire evidence, we are left with the definite 
and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.”  Morrison v. W. Builders 
of Amarillo, Inc. (In re Morrison), 555 F.3d 473, 480 (5th Cir. 2009) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
III. Discussion 
A. Mandatory Subordination under Section 510(b) 
The Trustee and Templeton primarily dispute the appropriate 
prioritization of Templeton’s claims relative to those of other claimants.  As 
discussed above, the Plan prioritizes claims against AHF into 19 classes.  
Templeton argues that his claims should fall within Class 17 as “General 
Unsecured Claims”—for which the estimated recovery would be 20% to 40% of 
the value of his claims.  The Trustee argues that Templeton’s claims should 
fall within Class 18—“Allowed Subordinated Claims”—a class for which the 
estimated recovery is 0%.  The bankruptcy court held in favor of the Trustee, 
ordering that Templeton’s entire Claim be “subordinated to all allowed general 
unsecured claims.” 
As an initial matter, we note that the bankruptcy court’s reasoning, at 
least with respect to Templeton’s claims arising out of AHF’s guaranties, 
appears to be premised on a recharacterization of those guaranties as equity 
interests in AHF pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 502(b).  See Grossman v. Lothian Oil 
Inc. (In re Lothian Oil Inc.), 650 F.3d 539, 543 (5th Cir. 2011) (holding that 
recharacterization stems from bankruptcy court’s power to disallow a claim, 
but that “recharacterization is appropriate when the claimant has some rights 
[vis-à-vis] the bankrupt” (internal quotation marks omitted)).  Accordingly, 
much of the parties’ briefing is focused on this recharacterization issue.  
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Nonetheless, we need not reach that issue,12 as we conclude for the reasons 
discussed below that Section 510(b) mandates the subordination of 
Templeton’s entire Claim.  Indeed, the bankruptcy court’s judgment does not 
mention recharacterization under Section 502(b), but rather states that 
“Templeton’s Claim is subordinated pursuant to the provisions of 11 U.S.C. 
§ 510(b).”  It is fundamental that we “review[] judgments, not opinions,” 
Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842 
(1984), and that “this court may affirm a judgment upon any basis supported 
by the record,” Davis v. Scott, 157 F.3d 1003, 1005 (5th Cir. 1998). 
It is also worth noting that throughout this action, the primary theory 
underlying the Trustee’s objection to Templeton’s Claim has stemmed from the 
premise that Templeton’s investments were abusive tax shelters and that 
Templeton “knew or should have known that the investment[s] [were] purely 
for illegitimate and improper tax purposes.”  Even assuming arguendo the 
truth of this premise, we need not decide whether such misconduct warrants 
subordination under the Bankruptcy Code.  Rather, as discussed below, we 
affirm the judgment subordinating Templeton’s Claim solely on the basis of 
Section 510(b), which is narrowly focused on the nature of the claims and 
transactions at issue. 
Section 510(b) states: 
For the purpose of distribution under this title, a claim arising 
from rescission of a purchase or sale of a security of the debtor or 
of an affiliate of the debtor, for damages arising from the purchase 
or sale of such a security, or for reimbursement or contribution 
allowed under section 502 on account of such a claim, shall be 
                                         
12 A threshold issue in the bankruptcy court’s recharacterization analysis is whether 
Templeton’s equity investments in the LPs can be “recharacterized” as equity investments in 
AHF.  Most of the recharacterization case law involves recharacterizing transactions in the 
same entity.  The bankruptcy court’s judgment, relying as it does on Section 510(b), avoids 
this issue, as do we. 
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subordinated to all claims or interests that are senior to or equal 
the claim or interest represented by such security, except that if 
such security is common stock, such claim has the same priority as 
common stock. 
11 U.S.C. § 510(b).  This provision “‘serves to effectuate one of the general 
principles of corporate and bankruptcy law: that creditors are entitled to be 
paid ahead of shareholders in the distribution of corporate assets.’”  SeaQuest 
Diving, LP v. S&J Diving, Inc. (In re SeaQuest Diving, LP), 579 F.3d 411, 417 
(5th Cir. 2009) (quoting Racusin v. Am. Wagering, Inc. (In re Am. Wagering, 
Inc.), 493 F.3d 1067, 1071 (9th Cir. 2007)).  “[T]he most important policy 
rationale” behind Section 510(b) is that claims “seek[ing] to recover a portion 
of claimants’ equity investment[s]” should be subordinated.  Id. at 421.  
Moreover, “Section 510(b) applies whether the securities were issued by the 
debtor or by an affiliate of the debtor.”  Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommer, 
Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 510.04[04] (16th ed. 2014) (emphasis added).  
Accordingly, this provision makes clear that claims arising from equity 
investments in a debtor’s affiliate should be treated the same as equity 
investments in the debtor itself—i.e., both are subordinated to the claims of 
general creditors.  The Trustee argues, and we agree, that all of Templeton’s 
claims are claims “for damages arising from the purchase or sale of” a 
“security . . . of an affiliate of [AHF].”  We reach this result through a step-by-
step analysis of this provision. 
 We first conclude that Templeton’s claims are claims for “damages.”  
With respect to the “unliquidated claims”—i.e., those for fraud, breach of 
fiduciary duties, and money-had-and-received—Templeton clearly seeks 
damages for injuries resulting from these torts.13  Cf. Baroda Hill Invs., Ltd. 
                                         
13 Indeed, Templeton asserted in his Claim that he was “damaged as a result of the 
fraud.”  Moreover, Templeton does not appear to dispute that the unliquidated claims are 
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v. Telegroup, Inc. (In re Telegroup, Inc.), 281 F.3d 133, 142 (3d Cir. 2002) 
(“Congress enacted § 510(b) to prevent disappointed shareholders from 
recovering their investment loss by using fraud and other securities claims to 
bootstrap their way to parity with general unsecured creditors in a bankruptcy 
proceeding.”).  Whether Templeton’s “liquidated claims” (seeking 
reimbursement under AHF’s guaranties) also constitute claims for damages is 
a more difficult question.  Several bankruptcy courts have reasoned that “the 
concept of ‘damages’” under Section 510(b) “has the connotation of some 
recovery other than the simple recovery of an unpaid debt due upon an 
instrument.”  In re Blondheim Real Estate, Inc., 91 B.R. 639, 640 (Bankr. 
D.N.H. 1988) (holding that claim for recovery on debtor’s promissory note 
should not be subordinated under 510(b)); see also In re Wyeth Co., 134 B.R. 
920, 921–22 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1991) (reasoning that “the use of the term 
‘damages’ implies more than a simple debt” and holding that debt on 
promissory notes should not be subordinated).  Yet the situation is different 
where, as here, the unpaid debt is itself an equity investment.  Templeton is 
not merely seeking recovery under independent promissory notes, but rather 
under guaranties which the bankruptcy court found to be “intimately 
intertwined” with the LP agreements.14  Although Templeton is suing for the 
breach of the guaranties of his LP interests (rather than suing directly for 
repayment of his equity investments in the LPs), this is exactly the elevation 
of form over substance that Section 510(b) seeks to avoid—by subordinating 
                                         
claims for damages, but rather argues only that those claims do not arise out of the purchase 
of security interests. 
14 The court found that “[a]nalyzing one instrument is pointless without consideration 
of the others.”  Templeton has given us no reason to conclude that these findings are clearly 
erroneous.  See Wyle v. C.H. Rider & Family (In re United Energy Corp.), 944 F.2d 589, 596 
(9th Cir. 1991) (“[Bankruptcy courts] possess the power to delve behind the form of 
transactions and relationships to determine the substance.”).   
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claims that functionally seek to “recover a portion of claimants’ equity 
investment[s].”15  In re SeaQuest Diving, LP, 579 F.3d at 421.  Moreover, as 
this court has noted, various circuits “have adopted [a] broad reading of the 
damages category” contained in Section 510(b), and “the circuit courts agree 
that a claim arising from the purchase or sale of a security can include a claim 
predicated on post-issuance conduct”—i.e., conduct after the issuance of the 
security—“such as breach of contract.”16  Id. (citing Am. Broad. Sys., Inc. v. 
Nugent (In re Betacom of Phoenix, Inc.), 240 F.3d 823, 831–32 (9th Cir. 2001), 
In re Telegroup, Inc., 281 F.3d at 141–42, Allen v. Geneva Steel Co. (In re 
Geneva Steel Co.), 281 F.3d 1173, 1180–81 (10th Cir. 2002), and Rombro v. 
Dufrayne (In re Med Diversified, Inc.), 461 F.3d 251, 256 (2d Cir. 2006)).  
Templeton’s guaranty claims here are essentially breach of contract claims, as 
Templeton himself concedes in his opening brief on appeal: “A breach of a 
guaranty is a breach of contract . . . .”  Accordingly, all of Templeton’s claims 
are fairly characterized as claims for “damages.” 
Next, there is no doubt that the LP interests Templeton purchased 
constitute “securities” within the meaning of Section 510(b).  The Bankruptcy 
Code expressly defines the term “security” to “include[] . . . [an] interest of a 
limited partner in a limited partnership.”  11 U.S.C. § 101(49)(A)(xiii).17 
                                         
15 As discussed above, we need not decide whether the guaranties themselves 
constitute debt rather than equity interests.  In any event, “the circuit courts agree that a 
claimant need not be an actual shareholder for his claim to be covered by § 510(b).”  In re 
SeaQuest, 579 F.3d at 422 (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted). 
16 These statements were dicta, as the court was addressing the rescission category, 
rather than the damages category, of Section 510(b).  See In re SeaQuest, 579 F.3d at 422.  In 
any event, we find the court’s discussion persuasive. 
17 Templeton argues that the unliquidated claims are not securities, but that 
contention is inapposite.  Although the claims themselves may not constitute securities 
within the meaning of the Bankruptcy Code, those claims nonetheless arise from the sale of 
securities of affiliates of AHF, and thus fall within the ambit of Section 510(b), for the reasons 
discussed below. 
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We also conclude that Templeton’s claims arise from the purchase of 
those securities.  “For a claim to ‘arise from’ the purchase or sale of a security, 
there must be some nexus or causal relationship between the claim and the 
sale.”  In re SeaQuest Diving, LP, 579 F.3d at 421.  We have little difficulty 
finding such a nexus between Templeton’s claims and his purchase of the LP 
interests.  In his opening brief on appeal, Templeton makes clear that his 
unliquidated tort claims stem directly from the LP investments; he asserts 
that: (1) AHF breached its fiduciary duties by allowing the funds he invested 
in the LPs “to be commingled and misappropriated;” (2) AHF defrauded 
Templeton by making “false statements to Templeton about his investments 
in the [LPs];” and (3) “monies provided by Templeton for the [LPs] were taken 
and used by AHF in a manner outside the scope and intent of the [LP] 
transaction documents.”  With respect to the guaranty claims, as discussed 
above, the bankruptcy court specifically found that the guaranties were 
“intimately intertwined” with the LP agreements, and that “the guaranties 
cannot be considered apart from the other transactions that arose in 
connection with the investments.”  These findings are not clearly erroneous; 
rather, it is clear from the record that the guaranties, at least in part, induced 
Templeton to make these investments.  Thus, we conclude that there is at least 
“some nexus or causal relationship” between Templeton’s claims and his 
purchase of the LP interests.  Id.  And as discussed above, the fact that 
Templeton is effectively attempting to recoup his equity investments in the 
LPs through his claims supports the application of Section 510(b) here.  Id. 
(“For a claim to ‘arise from’ the purchase or sale of a security, there must be 
some nexus or causal relationship between the claim and the sale.  Further, 
the fact that the claims in the case seek to recover a portion of claimants’ equity 
investment is the most important policy rationale.” (internal citation omitted)). 
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Furthermore, the LP interests here are securities “of an affiliate of 
[AHF].”  11 U.S.C. § 510(b).  The Bankruptcy Code defines “affiliate,” in 
relevant part, as a “person whose business is operated under a lease or 
operating agreement by a debtor, or person substantially all of whose property 
is operated under an operating agreement with the debtor.”18  11 U.S.C. 
§ 101(2)(C).  We first note that the Plan, confirmed by the bankruptcy court, 
states that all of the LPs at issue here are affiliates of AHF “pursuant to section 
101(2) of the Bankruptcy Code.”  In any event, setting aside the Plan provision, 
we conclude that the LPs are affiliates of AHF. 
First, all of the LPs—GOZ, M2M-2, M2M-3, Walden II, and Gray 
Ranch—are “persons” under the Bankruptcy Code.  11 U.S.C. § 101(41) 
(defining the term “person” to “include[] . . . partnership[s]”).  Second, each of 
the LPs is “operated under a[n] . . . operating agreement,” 11 U.S.C. 
§ 101(2)(C)—i.e., the LP agreements.  Although the term “operating 
agreement” is undefined in the Bankruptcy Code, there is little doubt that the 
LP agreements qualify.  They are quite literally agreements under which the 
LPs operate; the agreements define the business and purposes of each LP, 
making clear that each LP acts through its general partner to accomplish those 
purposes.19  We also conclude that the LPs were “operated under . . . operating 
                                         
18 The Bankruptcy Code includes three other definitions of “affiliate,” none of which 
are applicable here. 
19 We are not alone in reaching such a conclusion, see In re Minton Grp., Inc., 27 B.R. 
385, 389 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1983) (concluding that LP is affiliate of general partner debtor who 
“operates all of the business and manages all of the property of the limited partnership under 
a limited partnership agreement”), aff’d, 46 B.R. 222 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); cf. Jenkins v. 
Tomlinson (In re Basin Res. Corp.), 190 B.R. 824, 826–27 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1996) (concluding 
that joint venture agreements constitute operating agreements), and we are aware of no court 
that has held that LP agreements do not constitute “operating agreements” under the 
Bankruptcy Code, cf. In re Wash. Mut., Inc., 462 B.R. 137, 145–46 (Bankr. D. Del. 2011) 
(“Debtors have not adequately proven that the Pooling and Servicing Agreements constitute 
an operating agreement under the plain meaning of the statute.”).  Templeton relies on In re 
SemCrude, L.P., 436 B.R. 317 (Bankr. D. Del. 2010), in arguing that LP agreements are not 
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agreement[s] by a debtor.”  11 U.S.C. § 101(2)(C) (emphasis added).  We first 
note that the statute is unclear as to whether the “by a debtor” phrase is meant 
to modify the word “operated” or the phrase “operating agreement.”  Applying 
the former construction, it is clear that all of the LPs were “operated . . . by” 
AHF, as Templeton himself concedes: “AHF, as general partner of the [LPs] (or 
otherwise in control of the general partner of the [LPs]) had legitimate control 
of those entities giving AHF control over whatever revenue or income came to 
those entities.”  Under the latter construction, for which Templeton advocates, 
the operating agreement itself must be “by a debtor”—which may imply that 
the debtor must be a party to that agreement.  But even under that 
construction, we conclude that the LP agreements are agreements “by” AHF.  
We easily reach this conclusion with respect to the LPs for which AHF served 
as a general partner—i.e., GOZ and Walden II—as AHF was a party to those 
LP agreements.  But even for the LPs in which a wholly-owned subsidiary of 
AHF served as a general partner—M2M-2, M2M-3, and Gray Ranch—we 
conclude that those LP agreements were agreements “by” AHF within the 
meaning of the Bankruptcy Code.  Even though AHF was not a direct party to 
those agreements, it is undisputed that AHF, through Sterquell, had complete 
control over these LPs.  The bankruptcy court made the following factual 
findings with respect to this issue: 
Even where an AHF subsidiary was the named general partner in 
a partnership agreement with Templeton, AHF (and, really, 
Sterquell) was the party in full control.  Any intermediary did not 
affect AHF’s (or Sterquell’s) control. . . . As Templeton himself has 
stated, Sterquell, and by association, AHF, exerted total control 
over all aspects of the Templeton Deals.  This control was 
                                         
operating agreements, but in that case, the court determined that an LP was not an affiliate 
under the Bankruptcy Code because “[n]o . . . operating agreement was introduced into 
evidence” and the existence of an LP was only “mentioned” in hearings and briefs.  Id. at 321.  
Here, all of the LP agreements are contained in the record. 
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formalized by the partnership agreements and the formalized 
relationship between the partnerships and AHF or a wholly owned 
conduit. 
Templeton gives us no reason to question these factual findings.  It is therefore 
clear that, as a factual matter, AHF was the operator of these LPs despite the 
fact that it was not a formal party to the LP agreements.  Accordingly, we hold 
that these agreements were operating agreements “by” AHF, as the wholly-
owned subsidiaries were only shell entities and, in the words of the Bankruptcy 
Court, “conduit[s]” through which AHF acted. 
We recognize that this conclusion is in tension with decisions reached by 
several bankruptcy courts.  See In re Wash. Mut., Inc., 462 B.R. at 146 (holding 
that “because the agreement in question is between two non-debtors, it cannot 
provide a basis for subordination under section 101(2)(C),” and rejecting the 
argument that “mere ‘control’ of an entity is sufficient to ignore its legal 
separateness”); In re SemCrude, L.P., 436 B.R. at 321 (“[E]ven if the Debtors 
could show that the partnership agreement is a lease or operating agreement, 
the agreement is between two non-debtors.”); In re Sporting Club at Ill. Ctr., 
132 B.R. 792, 797 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1991) (determining that entity was not an 
affiliate of debtor for purposes of venue statute where the debtors were not 
“parties to any lease or operating agreement”); In re Maruki USA Co., 97 B.R. 
166, 169 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1988) (rejecting, for purposes of venue statute, 
argument that entity was affiliate of debtor where debtor owned 100% of stock 
of entity’s general partner).  These cases—to which we are not bound—have 
applied unduly strict interpretations of the phrase “agreement by a debtor,” 11 
U.S.C. § 101(2)(C), ignoring that an agreement may functionally be “by” the 
debtor even where the debtor is not a party to the agreement.  We see no reason 
why the existence of a shell conduit between a debtor and an entity—which in 
no way inhibits the debtor’s ability to control and operate that entity—should 
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preclude a finding of affiliate status.  The In re Washington Mutual court relied 
in part on the theory underlying Section 510(b), reasoning that the claimant 
“should be treated like any other creditor of [the debtor] because [the claimant] 
never assumed the risks of a . . . shareholder” of the debtor, but rather assumed 
only the risks of a shareholder of a separate entity.  In re Wash. Mut., Inc., 462 
B.R. at 147.  But this line of reasoning would seem to preclude mandatory 
subordination of any claim arising from the purchase of an affiliate’s securities 
(since the securities of the affiliate are not shares in the debtor)—a result at 
odds with the plain language of Section 510(b).  Rather, Congress clearly 
intended that claims arising from the purchase of securities of entities over 
which the debtor exercised sufficient control—i.e., entities which qualify as 
affiliates under the Bankruptcy Code—be treated no differently than claims 
arising from the purchase of securities of the debtor itself.  See Alan N. Resnick 
& Henry J. Sommer, Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 510.04[04] (16th ed. 2014) 
(“Section 510(b) applies whether the securities were issued by the debtor or by 
an affiliate of the debtor.”).   
 Because each of Templeton’s claims is a claim for damages arising from 
the purchase of securities of AHF’s affiliates, we hold that Section 510(b) 
mandates the subordination of those claims.  Accordingly, we affirm the 
bankruptcy court’s judgment with respect to subordination.20 
                                         
20 Templeton also argues that AHF is liable to Templeton as the general partner of 
GOZ and Walden II, correctly noting that, “in a limited partnership, the general partner is 
always liable for the debts and obligations of the partnership.”  Asshauer v. Wells Fargo 
Foothill, 263 S.W.3d 468, 474 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2008, no pet.).  However, Templeton fails 
to identify what debts or obligations—independent of the liquidated or unliquidated claims—
these LPs directly owed Templeton.  Assuming Templeton is referring to the Walden II LP 
agreement’s promise to repay Templeton’s initial capital contribution (the GOZ LP 
agreement contains no such promise), and assuming the validity of that promise (which the 
Trustee challenges), we nonetheless conclude that any claim arising from such a promise 
must be subordinated under Section 510(b) for the same reasons as compel subordination of 
the guaranty-based, liquidated claims.  The fact that the promise is contained in the LP 
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B. Trustee’s Objections to Templeton’s Claim 
The bankruptcy court declined to rule on the Trustee’s various objections 
to the validity of Templeton’s Claim in light of its decision to subordinate the 
Claim.  The Trustee, perhaps recognizing that the practical effect of 
subordinating Templeton’s claim to Class 18 is that Templeton will receive 
nothing, cross-appeals as to these issues only “[t]o the extent this Court 
reverses the bankruptcy court’s order subordinating the Claim.”  Accordingly, 
because we affirm with respect to subordination, we need not reach the 
Trustee’s objections. 
C. Preferential Transfers under Section 547 
Templeton also challenges the bankruptcy court’s decision to grant the 
Trustee’s cause of action for the avoidance and recovery of preferential 
transfers pursuant to Section 547(b) of the Bankruptcy Code.  This provision 
generally allows trustees to “avoid any transfer of an interest of the debtor in 
property” made to creditors “on or within 90 days before the date of the filing 
of the petition.”  11 U.S.C. § 547(b).  The transfers at issue here amount to 
$157,500 Templeton and his wife received from the AHFD account in the 
ninety days leading up to AHF’s bankruptcy.21  Templeton contends that 
avoidance of these transfers was improper because: (1) the funds in the AHFD 
account were not funds of AHF, and (2) the payments fall within the ordinary 
course of business exception to the avoidance of preferential transfers. 
1. Property of Debtor 
Templeton first argues that the transferred funds were not “interest[s] 
of the debtor in property,” 11 U.S.C. § 547(b), as those funds were held in and 
                                         
agreement itself, and not in a separate guaranty, only solidifies the conclusion that this claim 
“aris[es] from the purchase . . . of . . . a security” of Walden II.  11 U.S.C. § 510(b). 
21 Templeton asserts that these payments were “quarterly preferred return payments 
provided for in Templeton’s transaction with Walden II.” 
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transferred from the AHFD account—of which AHF was not a legal titleholder, 
see Southmark Corp. v. Grosz (In re Southmark Corp.), 49 F.3d 1111, 1115 (5th 
Cir. 1995) (“A preliminary requisite [under Section 547(b)] is that the transfer 
involve property of the debtor’s estate.”).  Whether these funds constituted 
property of AHF is a question of state law.  See Stettner v. Smith (In re IFS 
Fin. Corp.), 669 F.3d 255, 261–62 (5th Cir. 2012) (applying Texas law to 
determine whether, under Section 544(b) of the Bankruptcy Code, bank 
accounts constituted “an interest of the debtor in property”); see also Butner v. 
United States, 440 U.S. 48, 54 (1979) (“Congress has generally left the 
determination of property rights in the assets of a bankrupt’s estate to state 
law.”). 
Although AHF was not the legal titleholder to the AHFD account, “Texas 
law counsels that the legal titleholder to a bank account is not always the 
owner of its contents.”  In re IFS Fin. Corp., 669 F.3d at 262.  Rather, an entity 
can be a “de facto” owner of a bank account if it has a sufficient level of control 
over the account.  See id.; see also In re Southmark Corp., 49 F.3d at 1116 n.17 
(“[I]t is undisputed that Southmark controlled the funds in the Payroll Account 
and that it could have paid them to anyone, including its own creditors.  For 
the purposes of preference law, therefore, the money in Southmark’s Payroll 
Account is treated as part of Southmark’s estate, whether or not Southmark 
actually owns it.”).  Thus, in In re IFS Financial Corp., this court held that a 
debtor had a property interest in bank accounts to which it was not a legal 
titleholder where the “record reflect[ed] that [the debtor] exercised such control 
over these accounts that it had de facto ownership over these accounts, as well 
as the funds they contained.”  669 F.3d at 264 (“[T]he facts support the district 
court’s and bankruptcy court’s findings that [the debtor] dominated these 
subsidiaries to such an extent that the subsidiaries acted at [the debtor]’s 
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direction and that the directors and stockholders utilized the corporate entity 
as a sham to perpetuate a fraud.”).  The court reasoned that “control is decisive, 
and that legal title is irrelevant where, as here, a debtor organization has taken 
care to mask its activities through fictional divisions.”  Id. at 263. 
The present case is materially indistinguishable.  The bankruptcy court 
found that AHFD “was an entity controlled by AHF and Sterquell and used by 
AHF and Sterquell as a conduit bank account,” and that “payments made to 
Templeton out of the [AHFD] account within ninety days of the filing of the 
Bankruptcy Case were with funds from an account wholly controlled by AHF 
and, therefore, constitute payments from AHF.”  These findings—with which 
Templeton apparently agreed in prior proceedings22—are not clearly 
erroneous.  Templeton argues that Sterquell, rather than AHF, controlled the 
account.  But Templeton concedes that Sterquell made various transfers from 
the AHFD account on AHF’s behalf—e.g., to pay AHF’s “ordinary needs and 
expenditures.”  Accordingly, we find no clear error in the bankruptcy court’s 
conclusions regarding AHF’s control (and, consequently, its de facto 
ownership) of the AHFD account, at least with respect to the funds at issue.23 
Templeton also asserts a constructive trust theory on appeal, arguing 
that because the AHFD account “was the res of a constructive trust, . . . AHF 
never gained title to those funds.”  However, Templeton has waived this 
argument by failing to sufficiently raise it before the bankruptcy court.  
                                         
22 We need not decide, however, whether Templeton’s arguments as to this issue are 
precluded on the basis of issue preclusion or judicial estoppel. 
23 Templeton also argues that a “control theory” should not apply here, given that AHF 
served as a general partner in AHFD and a general partner always exercises dominion and 
control over an LP’s property.  However, the bankruptcy court did not merely find that AHF 
controlled the AHFD account funds vis-à-vis its role as general partner.  Rather, the 
bankruptcy court determined that the AHFD account was a “conduit” wholly controlled by 
AHF—and, as Templeton admits, used by AHF for its own purposes. 
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Templeton correctly notes that he alleged a constructive trust theory in his 
Claim, but, as the bankruptcy court noted, a constructive trust theory “w[as] 
not raised at trial.”  It does not appear that Templeton mentioned, much less 
adequately briefed, a constructive trust theory in either his pre- or post-trial 
briefing—thus depriving the bankruptcy court of an adequate opportunity to 
rule on the issue.  “If an argument is not raised to such a degree that the [trial] 
court has an opportunity to rule on it, we will not address it on appeal.”  Nasti 
v. CIBA Specialty Chems. Corp., 492 F.3d 589, 595 (5th Cir. 2007) (internal 
quotation marks omitted); see also Butler Aviation Int’l, Inc. v. Whyte (In re 
Fairchild Aircraft Corp.), 6 F.3d 1119, 1128 (5th Cir. 1993) (stating, in the 
bankruptcy context, that “the argument must be raised to such a degree that 
the trial court may rule on it” to avoid waiver). 
2. Ordinary Course of Business Defense 
Templeton next argues that the ordinary course of business defense 
applies to these transfers.24  Under that defense, a trustee may not avoid a 
transfer under Section 547: 
to the extent that such transfer was in payment of a debt incurred 
by the debtor in the ordinary course of business or financial affairs 
of the debtor and the transferee, and such transfer was— 
(A) made in the ordinary course of business or financial 
affairs of the debtor and the transferee; or  
(B) made according to ordinary business terms . . . . 
11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(2).  “[T]he ordinary course of business defense provides a 
safe haven for a creditor who continues to conduct normal business on normal 
terms.”  Gulf City Seafoods, Inc. v. Ludwig Shrimp Co., Inc. (In re Gulf City 
                                         
24 Although the ordinary course of business defense was raised by Templeton in the 
joint pretrial order and in his post-trial briefing, the bankruptcy court did not address that 
defense in its order. 
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Seafoods, Inc.), 296 F.3d 363, 367 (5th Cir. 2002).  This court has explained 
that, “[w]ithout this defense, the moment that a debtor faced financial 
difficulties, creditors would have an incentive to discontinue all dealings with 
that debtor and refuse to extend new credit.”  Id.  Thus, “[l]acking credit, the 
debtor would face almost insurmountable odds in its attempt to make its way 
back from the edge of bankruptcy.”  Id.   
Templeton argues that the payments at issue here—interest payments 
on his Walden II investments—were regularly made for over a year before 
Section 547(b)’s preference period began, and were therefore made in the 
ordinary course of business.  The Trustee does not dispute this history of 
payments, but rather asserts that the transfers could not have been made in 
the ordinary course of business because they “were made in furtherance of the 
Ponzi scheme and Sterquell’s fraud.”25  The Trustee relies on a line of cases 
narrowly holding that “a Ponzi scheme is not a business, and that transfers 
related to the scheme are not within the ‘ordinary course of business.’”  
Henderson v. Buchanan, 985 F.2d 1021, 1025 (9th Cir. 1993); see Danning v. 
Bozek (In re Bullion Reserve of N. Am.), 836 F.2d 1214, 1219 (9th Cir. 1988); 
Graulty v. Brooks (In re Bishop, Baldwin, Rewald, Dillingham & Wong, Inc.), 
819 F.2d 214, 216–17 (9th Cir. 1987); see also Sender v. Nancy Elizabeth R. 
Heggland Family Trust (In re Hedged-Invs. Assocs., Inc.), 48 F.3d 470, 475–76 
(10th Cir. 1995) (rejecting rule that would “prohibit[] application of the 
ordinary course of business defense for all transfers made in the course of a 
Ponzi scheme” and instead adopting the “narrower proposition that transfers 
to investors [in the course of a Ponzi scheme] are not entitled to the ordinary 
                                         
25 Although we hesitate to be absolute about the contents of a 20,000+ page record, 
the Ponzi scheme argument does not appear to have been raised in the bankruptcy court.  We 
address the issue because the district court ruled on this basis and it has been fully briefed 
in our court. 
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course of business exception.”).  The Fifth Circuit has similarly held, in the 
context of another ordinary course of business exception within the 
Bankruptcy Code (Section 546(e)),26 that “‘[t]ransfers made in a ‘Ponzi’ scheme 
are not made in the ordinary course of business.’”  Wider v. Wootton, 907 F.2d 
570, 572 (5th Cir. 1990) (quoting In re Bullion Reserve of N. Am., 985 F.2d at 
1219).  Notably, these cases all involved true Ponzi schemes—i.e., operations 
built on the collection of funds from new investments to pay off prior investors.  
See Henderson, 985 F.2d at 1023 (“[T]he whole operation amounted to a Ponzi 
scheme.”); In re Bullion Reserve of N. Am., 836 F.2d at 1219 n.8 (“The record 
indicates that BRNA was conducting such a [Ponzi] scheme when it used newly 
acquired funds, from its comingled accounts, to buy bullion for customers who 
demanded their metal.”); In re Bishop, Baldwin, Rewald, Dillingham & Wong, 
Inc., 819 F.2d at 216 (“Brooks does not dispute that the debtor was operating 
a Ponzi scheme . . . .”); In re Hedged-Invs. Assocs., Inc., 48 F.3d at 471 (“The 
essence of the scheme was to attract investors by guaranteeing substantial 
returns from stock options trading.  Mr. Donahue paid ‘profits’ to earlier 
investors with the investment capital of later investors, publicly reporting false 
earnings as ‘proof’ of his success.”); Wider, 907 F.2d at 572 (“Cohen satisfied 
outstanding debts with older clients—including the debt owed Wider on the 
bounced checks—from the funds he acquired from later clients.  In common 
industry parlance, Cohen operated a ‘Ponzi’ scheme.”).   
AHF’s business does not constitute a Ponzi scheme for purposes of this 
exception.  The Trustee points to some evidence in the record that there was 
                                         
26 In Wider, we suggested that the analysis of the exception under Section 546(e) 
should be the same as that under 547(c)(2).  See Wider, 907 F.2d at 572 n.1 (“[T]his Court 
fails to see how a Ponzi scheme could be in the ordinary course of business for purposes of 
the stockholder defense, but not in the ordinary course of business for purposes of the 
preference provisions.”). 
No. 14-10563 
29 
“an element of a Ponzi scheme” in the business, but that evidence shows that 
only a portion of the funds collected by AHF (Templeton estimates 9%) was 
used to pay Ponzi-like returns to investors.  In any event, the record is clear 
that AHF engaged in substantial legitimate business—owning or controlling 
approximately 14,000 housing units.  Indeed, the Trustee asserted in the 
Disclosure Statement that “AHF and its tax-credit limited partners were 
engaged in the legitimate affordable housing business.”  Although that 
business appears to have deteriorated over time—leading to Sterquell’s and 
AHF’s later misuse of funds—this does not render the business a Ponzi scheme.  
The theory underlying the Ponzi exception to the ordinary course of business 
defense is that “Ponzi schemes simply are not legitimate business enterprises 
which Congress intended to protect with section 547(c)(2).”  In re Bishop, 
Baldwin, Rewald, Dillingham & Wong, Inc., 819 F.2d at 217; see also 
Henderson, 985 F.2d at 1025 (“[A] Ponzi scheme is not a business . . . .”); In re 
Bullion Reserve of N. Am., 836 F.2d at 1219 (“Congress intended the ordinary 
course of business exception to apply only to transfers by legitimate business 
enterprises.”).  Expanding this exception—as no other court, apparently, has 
done—to cover legitimate businesses in which there were some fraudulent or 
Ponzi-like transactions is inconsistent with this theory.  Accordingly, because 
the business at issue here is not a true Ponzi scheme, the transfers do not fall 
within the narrow Ponzi scheme exception to the ordinary course of business 
defense. 
Therefore, we reverse the judgment granting the avoidance and recovery 
of the $157,500 in purportedly preferential transfers and remand for further 
proceedings addressing, inter alia, the ordinary course of business defense 
raised by Templeton.  We intimate no view on the outcome. 
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D. Fraudulent Transfers under Section 548 
The Trustee also seeks the avoidance and recovery of approximately $1 
million in purportedly fraudulent transfers made from the AHFD account to 
Templeton and his wife between May 1, 2005, and February 2, 2009.  The 
fraudulent transfer provision of the Bankruptcy Code states, in relevant part: 
The trustee may avoid any transfer . . . of an interest of the debtor 
in property . . . that was made or incurred on or within 2 years 
before the date of the filing of the petition, if the debtor voluntarily 
or involuntarily— 
(A) made such transfer or incurred such obligation with 
actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud any entity to which 
the debtor was or became, on or after the date that such 
transfer was made or such obligation was incurred, 
indebted; or 
(B)(i) received less than a reasonably equivalent value in 
exchange for such transfer or obligation; and 
(ii)(I) was insolvent on the date that such transfer was made 
or such obligation was incurred, or became insolvent as a 
result of such transfer or obligation . . . . 
11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1).  Subsection (A) is referred to as the “actual fraud” 
provision, while subsection (B) is referred to as the “constructive fraud” 
provision.  Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Hayes (In re Hannover Corp.), 310 
F.3d 796, 799 (5th Cir. 2002). 
The bankruptcy court did not address whether the transfers were 
fraudulent, instead concluding that Templeton is entitled to the good faith 
defense under Section 548(c).  That provision states: 
Except to the extent that a transfer or obligation voidable under 
this section is voidable under section 544, 545, or 547 of this title, 
a transferee or obligee of such a transfer or obligation that takes 
for value and in good faith has a lien on or may retain any interest 
transferred or may enforce any obligation incurred, as the case 
may be, to the extent that such transferee or obligee gave value to 
the debtor in exchange for such transfer or obligation. 
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11 U.S.C. § 548(c).  The bankruptcy court concluded that Templeton “no doubt 
gave value in the amount of each of his investments,” finding that “Templeton’s 
investments well exceed the transfers.”  The court also disagreed with the 
Trustee’s assertion that “Templeton’s participation in Sterquell’s illegitimate 
tax schemes defeats his good faith claim,” given that “any complicity by 
Templeton with Sterquell concerning illegitimate tax deals did not defraud 
other creditors of AHF.”  The Trustee contends that the bankruptcy court’s 
conclusion as to good faith was in error because: (1) Templeton did not give 
value to AHF, and (2) Templeton did not do so in good faith. 
First, Templeton may be entitled to the good faith defense only “to the 
extent [he] gave value to [AHF] in exchange for” the transfers at issue.  11 
U.S.C. § 548(c).  Under Section 548, “‘value’ means property, or satisfaction or 
securing of a present or antecedent debt of the debtor, but does not include an 
unperformed promise to furnish support to the debtor or to a relative of the 
debtor.”  11 U.S.C. § 548(d)(2)(A).  A finding of value is reviewed for clear error, 
as that determination is “largely a question of fact, as to which considerable 
latitude must be allowed to the trier of the facts.”  In re Hannover Corp., 310 
F.3d at 801 (internal quotation marks omitted).  However, “we review de novo 
the methodology employed by the bankruptcy court in assigning values to the 
property transferred and the consideration received.”  Id. (internal quotation 
marks omitted).  Moreover, “for purposes of § 548 the value of an 
investment . . . is to be determined at the time of purchase.”  Id. at 802.  Courts 
generally construe the term “value” broadly for purposes of the Bankruptcy 
Code.  See In re Fairchild Aircraft Corp., 6 F.3d at 1127 (“Courts have 
considered such indirect financial effects as, for example, the synergy realized 
from joining two enterprises, the increase in a credit line, and the increased 
monetary ‘float’ resulting from guarantying the loans of another, as 
No. 14-10563 
32 
constituting value received under § 548.” (footnotes omitted)); see also Pension 
Transfer Corp. v. Beneficiaries Under the Third Amendment to Fruehauf 
Trailer Corp. Ret. Plan No. 003 (In re Fruehauf Trailer Corp.), 444 F.3d 203, 
212 (3d Cir. 2006) (“We have interpreted ‘value’ to include any 
benefit, . . . whether direct or indirect. . . . [T]he mere opportunity to receive an 
economic benefit in the future constitutes ‘value’ under the Bankruptcy Code.” 
(internal citation, quotation marks, and brackets omitted)). 
The Trustee argues that Templeton did not give value to the debtor, 
AHF, in view of the facts that he made investments in the LPs and, “[a]t the 
time of the transaction[s], Templeton did not believe that he was giving value 
to AHF.”27  The Trustee relies heavily on the following statement in the 
bankruptcy court’s order: “By the very structure of each of the Templeton 
Deals, AHF received nothing in return for its guaranty.  In each instance, AHF 
is, per the deal, nothing more than a fractional interest holder in the limited 
partnership into which Templeton’s investment dollars were to flow.”  
However, as discussed above, the bankruptcy court also stated that Templeton 
“no doubt gave value in the amount of each of his investments,” and 
“Templeton’s investments well exceed the transfers.”  These factual findings 
are difficult to reconcile.  Moreover, although the bankruptcy court concluded 
that “AHF . . . was the party in full control” of the LPs, the bankruptcy court 
made no factual findings regarding when, how, and to what degree Sterquell 
                                         
27 We note that the Trustee’s focus on Templeton’s belief at the time of the investments 
appears misplaced.  Rather, “the recognized test is whether the investment conferred an 
economic benefit on the debtor; which benefit is appropriately valued as of the time the 
investment was made.”  In re Fairchild Aircraft Corp., 6 F.3d at 1127 (footnote omitted).  
Although the In re Fairchild Aircraft Corp. court was interpreting the term “reasonably 
equivalent value” under Section 548(a)(2), id. at 1125–27, this court has suggested that the 
same analysis applies to the interpretation of value under Section 548(c), In re Hannover 
Corp., 310 F.3d at 801. 
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and AHF diverted Templeton’s investments to AHF for its own use.28  Thus, 
we are not in a position to determine whether, at the time of each of his 
investments, Templeton gave value to AHF.29 
With respect to whether Templeton entered into the transactions at 
issue in good faith, we agree with the Trustee that the bankruptcy court 
applied the wrong standard.  In finding good faith, the bankruptcy court relied 
exclusively on its determination that Templeton’s actions did not defraud other 
creditors of AHF.  That is not the test for good faith.  Although this court has 
not announced a definitive definition of good faith under Section 548(c) in a 
published case, see In re Hannover Corp., 310 F.3d at 800–01 (noting that 
“there is little agreement among courts regarding the appropriate legal 
standard for this defense” and declining to “propound a broad rule concerning 
‘good faith’”), we have stated in an unpublished case that we must “look to 
whether the claimant was on notice of the debtor’s insolvency or the fraudulent 
nature of the transaction.”  Horton, 544 F. App’x at 520.  We further stated: 
The good faith test under Section 548(c) is generally presented as 
a two-step inquiry.  The first question typically posed is whether 
the transferee had information that put it on inquiry notice that 
the transferor was insolvent or that the transfer might be made 
                                         
28 For example, there are no findings regarding what portion of Templeton’s 
investments was used for the LPs’ legitimate business, compared to the portion of those funds 
used by AHF for its own benefit.  Nor are there any findings as to when AHF, through 
Sterquell, took action to divert the funds. 
29 The Trustee argues that we can reverse and render judgment in its favor on this 
issue based on the present record, relying on another case arising from similar claims in 
AHF’s bankruptcy proceedings, Horton v. O’Cheskey (In re Am. Hous. Found.), 544 F. App’x 
516 (5th Cir. 2013) (unpublished).  In Horton, which involved similar LP investments, we 
held that “the bankruptcy court’s finding that AHF did not receive any value in exchange for 
its guaranty [of the LP investment] was not clearly erroneous” where “AHF had a 0.01% 
partnership interest in [the LP] at the time of the exchange.”  Id. at 520.  This holding may 
be in some tension with the broad construction given to “value” under the Bankruptcy Code.  
See In re Fairchild Aircraft Corp., 6 F.3d at 1127; In re Fruehauf Trailer Corp., 444 F.3d at 
212.  In any event, given the conflicting factual findings of the bankruptcy court here, we 
deem it appropriate to remand with respect to this issue. 
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with a fraudulent purpose.  While the cases frequently cite either 
fraud or insolvency, these two elements are consistently identified 
as the triggers for inquiry notice.  The fraud or insolvency 
predicate is set forth in countless cases . . . . 
. . . The weight of the authority . . . indicates that a court should 
focus on the circumstances specific to the transfer at issue—that 
is, whether a transferee reasonably should have known . . . of the 
fraudulent intent underlying the transfer. 
Once a transferee has been put on inquiry notice of either the 
transferor’s possible insolvency or of the possibly fraudulent 
purpose of the transfer, the transferee must satisfy a “diligent 
investigation” requirement. 
Id. (quoting Christian Bros. High Sch. Endowment v. Bayou No Leverage Fund, 
LLC (In re Bayou Grp., LLC), 439 B.R. 284, 310–12 (S.D.N.Y. 2010)).  The 
parties do not dispute that this is the appropriate test for determining good 
faith under Section 548(c). 
The bankruptcy court did not apply this test below.  Even assuming the 
bankruptcy court was correct in determining that Templeton’s actions did not 
defraud creditors, this does not answer the question of whether Templeton was 
aware (or on inquiry notice) of AHF’s insolvency or fraud.  Given that this 
determination may hinge in part on questions of credibility and Templeton’s 
state of mind with respect to various transactions, see In re Hannover Corp., 
310 F.3d at 800 (“The most important set of questions [in the good faith 
inquiry] concerns the transferee’s state of mind.”), it would be prudent for the 
bankruptcy court to apply this test in the first instance. 
We therefore reverse and remand so that the bankruptcy court may 
address both issues underlying the applicability of the good faith defense—
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whether Templeton gave value in exchange for the transfers and whether he 
did so in good faith—in a manner consistent with this opinion.30  
IV. Conclusion 
For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the subordination of Templeton’s 
claim and REVERSE the bankruptcy court’s rulings on the alleged preferential 
and fraudulent transfers and REMAND for further proceedings consistent 
with this opinion. 
                                         
30 In addition, if the bankruptcy court deems the good faith defense inapplicable, it 
must determine in the first instance whether the transfers were either actually or 
constructively fraudulent. 
